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“WORSE THAN THE DISEASE”:
THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PRINCIPLE, FREE
EXPRESSION, AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
Martin H. Redish* and Elana Nightingale Dawson**
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction:
The one by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence;
the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same
passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that
it was worse than the disease.
—James Madison, THE FEDERALIST NO. 101
INTRODUCTION
A number of scholars and jurists have long deplored what they see as the
corruption of the American political process.2 In their view, too much money is
having too large and unsavory an impact on American politics, while simulta-
neously distorting political power towards the wealthy and seductively drawing
* Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern University
School of Law. Portions of this Article will appear in Professor Redish’s book, THE ADVERSARY
FIRST AMENDMENT (forthcoming Stanford University Press).
** J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; Law Clerk to the Honorable Gary
Feinerman, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL FEDERALIST
AND ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 167, 168 (David Wootton ed., 2003).
2 See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654 (1990) (finding
constitutional a Michigan law that prohibited “corporations from using corporate treasury
funds for independent expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, any candidate in elections
for state office”), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Burt Neuborne,
Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1055,
1056, 1071 (1999) (advocating for an “egalitarian conception of democracy” when the
“pervasive political inequality caused by massive wealth disparity” is limited); Frank J.
Sorauf, Politics, Experience, and the First Amendment: The Case of American Campaign
Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1359–60 (1994) (claiming that campaign finance reform
is necessary when people believe that “[Political Action Committees] have ‘bought’ the
Congress” regardless of whether this belief is legitimate); David A. Strauss, Corruption,
Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1994) (explaining
that corruption in a system of campaign finance is a concern rooted in “inequality and the
dangers of interest group politics”). See generally Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption
Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009).
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politicians away from pursuit of the public interest.3 One of the leading scholars ad-
vocating such a view, Professor Zephyr Teachout, has gone so far as to suggest that
there is actually an “anti-corruption principle” embedded in the Constitution,4 logically
implying that political corruption rises to the level of a constitutional violation. This
principle posits that, as a matter of American history and constitutional law, “office
holders” are constitutionally obligated to act in the “public interest” and in pursuit of
the “common good”; anything less is deemed to amount to “corruption.”5
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission6 only intensified scholars’ and jurists’ concerns about the dangers of po-
litical corruption.7 In Citizens United, the Court held that the section of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) limiting direct corporate political expenditures for
expression during a presidential campaign violated the First Amendment.8 In a strong-
ly worded dissent, Justice Stevens relied on arguments grounded in the anti-corruption
principle, as fashioned by Professor Teachout, to justify the BCRA’s suppression of
corporate political speech.9 Justice Stevens’s dissent, like Professor Teachout’s version
of the anti-corruption principle, relied on a broad definition of corruption—one ex-
tending far beyond the simple act of bribery.10 According to Justice Stevens, “[t]here
are threats of corruption that are far more destructive to a democratic society than
the odd bribe.”11
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Citizens United is not the first time the
Justices have sought to uphold restrictions on political speech in the name of anti-
corruption. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Supreme Court upheld
a state law that restricted corporate political expenditures in state elections.12 The
Austin Court considered Michigan’s law to be “aim[ed] at a different type of cor-
ruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggre-
gations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form.”13 The
Court’s decision in Austin, as Justice Scalia observed in his dissent, “endorse[d] the
3 See supra note 2 (illustrating judicial and scholarly disapproval of the impact that
wealth is having on American politics).
4 Teachout, supra note 2, at 342, 347.
5 Id. at 374.
6 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
7 See, e.g., Erica W. Morrison, Occupiers Wag Fingers at Supreme Court over Political
Donation Rule, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/occupiers
-wag-fingers-at-supreme-court-over-political-donation-rule/2012/01/20/gIQAriu0EQ_story.html.
8 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917.
9 Id. at 963–64 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Teachout,
supra note 2, at 348, 352).
10 Id. at 961–62.
11 Id. at 962.
12 494 U.S. 652, 654–55 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
13 Id. at 660.
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principle that too much speech is an evil that the democratic majority can proscribe.”14
The Austin decision allowed for “anything the Court deem[ed] politically undesirable
[to] be turned into political corruption—by simply describing its effects as politi-
cally ‘corrosive . . . .’”15
The anti-corruption principle developed by Professor Teachout provides im-
portant constitutional grounding for the theories relied upon by the Austin majority
and Justice Stevens’s opinion in Citizens United. Under the anti-corruption principle,
if proposed legislation undermines the “public good,” it is unconstitutional for a mem-
ber of Congress to vote for it, even if she believes it would benefit her constituents.16
The anti-corruption principle requires that members of Congress always be motivated
by the goal of advancing the “public good.”17 Any political action not motivated by
this goal is considered inherently “corrupt,” and therefore unconstitutional.18
The most radical element of Professor Teachout’s anti-corruption principle is
its conclusion that private citizens, as well as public officials, are to be treated as
“office holders” when they interact with the government.19 As such, they are consti-
tutionally restricted in what they can say and do in the political arena. Under the
anti-corruption principle, “[c]itizens must generally work for, and desire, the public
good, at least in their political interactions.”20 Despite the First Amendment’s guar-
antee to the contrary,21 under the anti-corruption principle a private citizen may not
petition the government for redress of grievances if the grievance is designed to
advance the citizen’s personal interests at the expense of the public good.22 Such a
limitation on a private citizen’s actions is an extraordinary leap beyond the regula-
tory framework of the Constitution, which, with the exception of the Thirteenth
Amendment,23 restricts only government action.24
Professor Teachout labels as “political corruption” any activity that brings about
political “inequality,” has the effect of “drowning out” other political voices, or gives
rise to a “dispirited public” or a loss of “political integrity.”25 Under her definition,
14 Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 684.
16 Teachout, supra note 2, at 374–75.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 377–79.
20 Id. at 378.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the
people to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
22 Teachout, supra note 2, at 378 (“A virtuous citizen will not consider his own good as sep-
arate from the public good and would not strive to use government to pursue his own ends.”).
23 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (prohibiting slavery in the United States).
24 See, e.g., id. amend. V (restricting only the federal government); id. amend. XIV
(restricting only state action).
25 Teachout, supra note 2, at 387; see also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 961
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that corruption can take
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“corruption” exists when those with financial means are allowed to use their “wealth
for political purposes.”26
In examining the premise and rationale of Professor Teachout’s anti-corruption
principle, it is important to understand its supposedly constitutional foundation. The
principle is designed to be far more than merely a policy-based limitation on—or
counterweight to—the First Amendment right of free expression. Rather, it is sup-
posed to function as a freestanding constitutional directive. It is easy to understand the
strategic goal of this characterization. If accepted, it would tend to equalize the con-
stitutional weight of the competing interests. For reasons to be explained, however,
as both a conceptual and historical matter, it borders on the incoherent to character-
ize the anti-corruption limits on private individuals as constitutionally dictated.27 In
fact, the truth is quite the opposite: not only is the anti-corruption principle not con-
stitutionally dictated, it is itself unconstitutional. The anti-corruption principle cate-
gorically limits political speech by deeming political activity “corrupt” when it is not
motivated by an altruistic interest in advancing the good of society as a whole.28
Under this principle, contributing money to or purchasing advertising on behalf of
candidates because their policies would benefit the private citizen’s personal inter-
ests would presumably be deemed an unconstitutional act.29
There is little doubt that adoption of the anti-corruption principle would have a
dramatically negative impact on the free and open communication of valuable po-
litical expression.30 In addition to the serious First Amendment implications raised
many forms and often “operates along a spectrum”); Burt Neuborne, One Dollar–One Vote:
A Preface to Debating Campaign Finance Reform, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 9 (1997) (defining
corruption broadly in a campaign finance context); Strauss, supra note 2, at 1382 (defining
corruption in political campaigns as giving contributions in exchange for specific acts by
representatives and noting that interest group politics is a problem of inequality).
26 Teachout, supra note 2, at 391 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
239, 259 (1986)); see also Neuborne, supra note 25, at 9 (discussing the prevention of
corruption in terms of “preventing unequal access to government officials predicated on
financial support”); Strauss, supra note 2, at 1382 (viewing corruption as “a problem because
of inequality”).
27 See discussion infra Part II.
28 Teachout, supra note 2, at 377–78. An interesting question is how are we to define “the
common good”? There are two alternatives: (1) an externally derived standard, determined by
judge or jury, or (2) an assessment of the private individual’s subjective perception of the
common good. Neither alternative is particularly attractive. Under the first alternative, the
government imposes its own normative value structure on the individual in contravention of
more traditional notions of free thought. See infra Part III. The second alternative, on the
other hand, requires a case-by-case legal assessment of the individual’s personal perception of
the common good, giving rise to obvious risks of manipulation, vagueness, and uncertainty.
An individual’s right of free expression should not be allowed to turn on such an inde-
terminate, undisciplined, and unpredictable inquiry.
29 See Teachout, supra note 2, at 378.
30 See infra Part III.
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by the anti-corruption principle, however, the history, theory, and logic used to
support the principle’s existence are seriously flawed. The Constitution imposes no
freestanding anti-corruption principle. In fact, the word “corruption” is used only
once, in the context of treason.31 What the Constitution does include are narrow,
prophylactic provisions aimed at protecting the government from specific harms
caused by corruption, rather than a general prohibition on corruption.32
Beyond its lack of any foundation in constitutional text, the anti-corruption prin-
ciple also lacks any basis in American historical practice.33 Interest groups, often fo-
cused exclusively on the advancement of the narrow interests of their members, have
long been part of the American political experience.34 Because the anti-corruption
principle rests on the theory that purely self-interested motivation—untied to pursuit
of the common good—in the political process is inherently improper, virtually all
interest group activity logically would have to be prohibited. This theory thus ig-
nores the central role that interest groups have always played in American politics.35
Indeed, the Constitutional Convention itself was overwhelmingly influenced by
special interests.36 Coalitions formed and regrouped throughout the Convention.37
Delegates were motivated to form coalitions by their state’s local interests, not by
some notion of a universal “common good,”38 and interest group activity certainly
did not cease when the Constitution was ratified. If anything, it steadily increased.39
Perhaps most troublesome is the fact that the anti-corruption principle stands in
stark contrast to the foundational precepts of American political theory that were
embodied in the First Amendment right of free expression.40 American democracy
is, for the most part, adversarial in nature.41 Thus, citizens are not required to pursue
advancement of the common good in their political activities; to the contrary, it is gen-
erally understood that citizens may seek to influence the political process to advance
their own personal interests. As one of the authors has previously written, citizens
have the right to “determine for themselves what governmental choices will improve
their lives.”42 To be sure, citizens may choose to pursue altruistic or ideological goals,
31 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (“[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of
Blood . . . .”).
32 See discussion infra Part II.A.
33 See discussion infra Part II.B.
34 See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
35 See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
36 See infra notes 148–57 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 148–57 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 148–57 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 176–79 and accompanying text.
40 See discussion infra Part II.
41 See infra notes 200–01 and accompanying text.
42 Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s
Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 1303, 1306 (2009).
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rather than narrow, selfish ones. But central to the notion of self-determination is gov-
ernmental “epistemological humility.”43 In regulating political advocacy, government
may not superimpose its own normative perspective. American democracy relies on
individual self-determination, as well as the interaction of adverse and competing
interests. By confining the constitutional protection of free expression to a universal
pursuit of the public good, the anti-corruption principle contravenes the core prem-
ise of the American democratic system.
Part I of this Article provides a detailed description of the anti-corruption prin-
ciple as its advocates—particularly Professor Teachout—have shaped it.44 The Part
that follows explores the numerous historical and conceptual flaws in the premises
that underlie the principle.45 The final Part examines the principle’s inconsistency with
a proper understanding of American democratic theory and its ominous implications
for the First Amendment right of free expression.46
I. UNDERSTANDING THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PRINCIPLE
It is necessary to understand what the anti-corruption principle entails before dis-
cussing its problematic premises and implications. Although a number of scholars and
jurists have advocated some form of an anti-corruption principle, Professor Teachout
has provided the most detailed and enthusiastic explication of the principle.47 The
fact that the leading anti-corruption advocate on the Supreme Court in recent years
has expressly relied on Professor Teachout’s scholarship adds further credibility to her
version of the principle.48 This discussion therefore focuses largely on her articulation
of the anti-corruption principle.
A. The Goals of the Anti-Corruption Principle
Although the prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption has
been recognized by the Supreme Court as an appropriate limitation on the First
Amendment’s reach in the electoral process, that concern has been viewed solely as
a sub-constitutional competing government interest, not as a freestanding consti-
tutional directive.49 Professor Teachout, however, seeks to take anti-corruption
43 Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican
Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 271 (1991).
44 See discussion infra Part I.
45 See discussion infra Part II.
46 See discussion infra Part III.
47 See generally Teachout, supra note 2.
48 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 947–48 n.51, 963–64 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Teachout, supra note 2).
49 FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985)
(“[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and com-
pelling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances.”).
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concerns out of the “competing government interest” category and place them on
equal constitutional footing with the right with which it competes. As fashioned by
Professor Teachout, the anti-corruption principle provides constitutionally grounded
justification for any governmental action aimed at fighting corruption.
Under the anti-corruption principle as Professor Teachout describes it, “political
virtue is pursuing the public good in public life.”50 Public officials, she asserts, must
be motivated by an interest in pursuing the “public good” when using “the reigns of
power.”51 Her version of the anti-corruption principle thus does far more than restrict
public officials’ actions; it also restricts their thoughts and motivations in taking those
actions. For example, if an elected official votes against a bill solely because she is
concerned about her reelection prospects, without considering the bill’s impact on the
common good, presumably her vote would have to be deemed corrupt. Indeed, her
vote would even have to be considered unconstitutional because it violated the anti-
corruption principle, which, according to Professor Teachout, is constitutionally
dictated. But even commission of such a violation does not necessarily provide an
express basis for impeachment.52 Thus, it is unclear what legal consequences would
flow from a public office-holder’s violation of the anti-corruption principle. What-
ever those consequences, however, under the anti-corruption principle it would
nevertheless be unconstitutional for an elected official to vote against a bill, even
though it would benefit the nation as a whole, solely because it would result in fewer
jobs in his district. An interest in one’s own constituents does not necessarily
translate into the public interest as a whole. Moreover, if an elected official’s
constituents advocate enactment of legislation because it would personally benefit
them, the constituents’ advocacy would also violate the anti-corruption principle.
Because, pursuant to Professor Teachout’s extremely broad definition of “office
holder,” private citizens are subject to the same stringent limits imposed by the anti-
corruption principle as government officials,53 their actions and motivations are
similarly subject to constitutional scrutiny. Under the anti-corruption principle,
according to Professor Teachout, the Constitution requires that individuals possess
civic virtue—meaning that they must “put[ ] public good before narrow personal in-
terests in [their] public actions.”54 In contrast, participants in the governing process
who are “tempted by narcissism, ambition, or luxury, to place private gain before pub-
lic good in their public actions” are deemed “corrupt.”55 Pursuant to her approach,
when a private person executes his “public duties”—including any engagement in the
political process or interaction with the government—he is constitutionally required
50 Teachout, supra note 2, at 374.
51 Id.
52 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (listing “Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and
Misdemeanors” as grounds for impeachment).
53 Teachout, supra note 2, at 377–79.
54 Id. at 375.
55 Id.
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to put the “public good” first.56 As bizarre as all of these results undoubtedly seem,
they are logically inescapable implications of Professor Teachout’s constitutionally
dictated version of the anti-corruption principle.
B. Defining the Terms
One might reasonably wonder why a constitutionally based anti-corruption prin-
ciple is needed in the first place, when we already have laws criminalizing corruption.
As already seen, however, the “corruption” prohibited by the anti-corruption principle
reaches far beyond prevailing understandings of the word.57 As shaped by Professor
Teachout, the anti-corruption principle prohibits “office holders” from taking any po-
litical action motivated purely by self-interest rather than the public good.58 Because
the concept of the “public good” is presumably to be defined subjectively,59 the anti-
corruption principle would seem to require only that office-holders believe that they are
acting in the interest of the “public good,” as they understand it. Corruption, therefore,
is “defined in terms of an attitude toward public service, not in relation to a set of
criminal laws.”60 The anti-corruption principle is premised on the notion that the con-
cept of “corruption” sweeps within its reach political activities that, although not
illegal in and of themselves, are rendered toxic by the actor’s purpose for engaging
in them.61 A person is “corrupt,” according to Professor Teachout, when “[t]he pub-
lic good does not motivate him.”62
The public’s use and understanding of the word “corruption” appears to be out
of step with a definition that encompasses otherwise legal activity solely because of
the actor’s motives. For example, the Wikipedia entry on the word “corruption” in
the political context confines the definition to criminal acts, such as extortion and
bribery.63 Moreover, the news stories on American corruption demonstrate that the
term’s modern understanding encompasses solely criminal behavior, not simply activ-
ity by public officials motivated by something other than pursuit of the public good.
For example, a Google search for the word “corruption” revealed not a single story
concerning Professor Teachout’s non-criminal version of the term.64 This suggests
that the definition employed by Professor Teachout—at least when measured against
common understanding—is at best exaggerated and at worst downright misleading.
56 Id. at 378 (“Citizens must generally work for, and desire, the public good, at least in
their political interactions.”).
57 See infra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.
58 Teachout, supra note 2, at 374.
59 But see supra note 28.
60 Teachout, supra note 2, at 374.
61 Id. at 375–76.
62 Id. at 374.
63 WIKIPEDIA, Corruption, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corruption (last visited May 1, 2012).
64 Corruption, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (search “corruption”).
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The definition of “office holder” under the anti-corruption principle is also
stretched well beyond common perceptions of the term. According to Professor
Teachout, “citizenship is a public office; like the public office of Senator or
President.”65 Therefore, “[a]ll citizens—especially powerful citizens—are respon-
sible for keeping public resources generally serving public ends.”66 This extreme
definition of “office holder” leads to the conclusion that private citizens, like gov-
ernment officials, are restrained by the Constitution’s anti-corruption principle.67
Thus, private citizens may not “ignore a general commitment to the public at
large.”68 Pursuant to this definition, a citizen is considered corrupt if her “inter-
actions with government or with politics” are motivated by self-interest.69 The con-
sequences are unclear, however, for a citizen if he were to violate the Constitution
by not “work[ing] for, and desir[ing], the public good.”70 Presumably, a constitu-
tionally dictated anti-corruption principle must have an enforcement mechanism.
Otherwise, individuals have no incentive to follow the principle’s mandate. Yet
Professor Teachout never discusses how the principle would be enforced against
any office-holder, let alone private citizens. Professor Teachout’s version of “cor-
ruption” and her enforcement of it in the Constitution thus place us in a constitu-
tional fantasy land in which the topography is, to say the least, uncharted.
Professor Teachout supports her claim that citizenship is a public office—and
that private citizens can therefore be deemed to have violated the Constitution—by
noting that “[p]eople regularly call a local businessman ‘corrupt’ if he tries to get
something out of government using political ties.”71 Because the public uses the term
“corrupt” to refer to private citizens as well as elected officials, she reasons, the con-
cept of citizenship as a public office will make sense to most people.72 The logical
implication of her definition of “office holder” to include private citizens is that citi-
zens are imbued with a “public trust” when they interact with government.73 Professor
Teachout argues that although citizens possess a constitutional right to petition the
government, they are simultaneously constitutionally obligated “to giv[e] credit and
thought to the impact on others, and to us[e] public channels for public ends.”74
One of the key purposes of the anti-corruption principle is the reduction, if not
complete elimination, of the influence of wealth in political campaigns. Campaign
65 Teachout, supra note 2, at 377.
66 Id.
67 See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text.
68 Teachout, supra note 2, at 378.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 379.
72 Id.
73 See id. at 378 (“This corruption of the citizen is possible in interactions with gov-
ernment or with politics. For a polity to work, citizens must not abuse the public trust in
those interactions.”).
74 Id.
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contributions result in corruption, Professor Teachout argues, when any of the fol-
lowing modern conceptions of “corruption” arise: (1) criminal bribery; (2) political
inequality; (3) “drowned voices”; (4) a “dispirited public”; or (5) “a lack of integ-
rity” in the political process.75 Quid pro quo bribery is described as “[t]he archetypal
corruption.”76 Even the “criminal bribery” concept, however, includes “possibly legal”
activities.77 This is true despite the fact that the Supreme Court has recognized a com-
pelling government interest only in the prevention of “quid-pro-quo corruption.”78
The “inequality” version of “corruption” equates the concept with unequal finan-
cial access to the political arena.79 Once money becomes involved in politics, Professor
Teachout argues, “it creates unequal access and unequal voice.”80 It follows, then, that
the anti-corruption principle mandates the removal of the unequal impact of money.
The anti-corruption principle could thus be employed to uphold limitations on po-
litical expenditures by candidates in order to even the political playing field.
An extension of the political equality argument is the notion that corruption also
occurs when the voices of powerful actors “drown[ ] out” the voices of other speakers.81
The anti-corruption principle would prohibit any communication that suppresses
other speech by virtue of its volume, whether literal (speech that is audibly louder than
other speech) or figurative (speech that is “louder” because more people hear it).
Again, the anti-corruption principle’s purpose is to limit the use of money by the
wealthy in order to give those without money an equal shot at contributing to the
American political colloquy.
The final two modern conceptions of “corruption” described by Professor
Teachout—a dispirited public and a lack of political integrity—are both tied to
public perception.82 Anything that gives rise to the perception of corruption has a
dispiriting impact on the public and therefore would be prohibited by the anti-
corruption principle. Integrity can be lost any time a person “leverag[es] the chan-
nels of power to tempt officials into non-public actions.”83 Under this formulation,
a constituent who contacts her elected representative about a matter of personal
importance threatens the integrity of the political process.
It is not difficult to see that Professor Teachout has expanded the concept of
“corruption” to include anything that conflicts with an ideological model committed
to notions of economic redistribution in the political process. Under her version of
the concept, those who are opposed to such redistribution in the political arena—on
75 Id. at 387.
76 Id. at 388.
77 Id. at 389.
78 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 478–79 (2007).
79 Teachout, supra note 2, at 392.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 394.
82 Id. at 394–95.
83 Id. at 396.
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either ideological or constitutional grounds—are automatically characterized as
supporters of corruption, with apparently nothing to distinguish support for such
“corruption” from open support for criminalized bribery. To be sure, reasonable
people can differ over the values of economic redistribution, both in the political
arena and society in general. But by treating the position of those with whom she
differs as the moral equivalent of support for bribery, Professor Teachout alters the
nature of the debate in ominous ways. The very use of the word “corruption” trig-
gers notions of evil and illegality that have no place in the modern debate over
American political theory and campaign finance.
C. The Origins of the Anti-Corruption Principle
Professor Teachout finds as the primary historical source of the modern anti-
corruption principle the debates at the Constitutional Convention. Madison’s notes
recorded mention of the word corruption fifty-four times.84 According to Professor
Teachout, the delegates’ discussion of corruption focused on two specific concerns:
(1) the potentially “corrupting influence of wealth, greed, and ambition” on the po-
litical process, and (2) the susceptibility of the nation to foreign corruption due to
its small size.85 The anti-corruption principle must be found in the Constitution, she
reasons, because concerns about the need to prevent corruption entered into “[s]ome
of the most extensive debates in the Convention—those about emoluments and per-
quisites for civil office, who should have the power of appointment, and the size of
the relative bodies.”86 According to Professor Teachout, the Framers’ overarching con-
cern with corruption led them to use “near-apocalyptic language and [to] search for
tools to ward off its threats.”87 She also cites Madison’s famed Federalist No. 10 as
support for the existence of the anti-corruption principle.88 Madison’s concern about
the dangerous influence of factions supposedly evinces his belief that the existence
of factions should be eliminated or, at the very least, controlled.89
There are, as we shall see, numerous inaccuracies in Professor Teachout’s under-
standing of the Framers’ comments and writings.90 It is important to note, however,
that even if one suspends historical disbelief for the moment and unquestioningly
accepts her understanding of the Framers’ intentions, Professor Teachout still must
make a far stronger showing in order to establish the existence of a constitutionally
dictated anti-corruption principle. She must further demonstrate that the Framers in-
tended to embody their understanding within the body of the document. It was, after
84 Id. at 353.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 376 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 1, at 79 (James Madison)).
89 Id. at 371–72 & n.151.
90 See discussion infra Part II.B.1–2.
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all, the Constitution’s text, not the disembodied understandings of the Framers, that
was subjected to the formal procedures of the ratification process. In an effort to meet
that burden, Professor Teachout identifies twenty-three constitutional features that
she believes support the existence of an overarching anti-corruption principle.91 She
contends that the sum total of all the specific constitutional clauses aimed at fighting
corruption amount to a freestanding constitutional anti-corruption principle.92 She
points to specific clauses in Articles I, II, and III to establish that the Framers intended
to embed an anti-corruption principle in the Constitution.93 Article I, she asserts “was
shaped by concerns that the House [of Representatives] would be populated by men
of weak will, easily corrupted to use their office for venal ends, and that the Senate
would become corrupted by vanity and luxury.”94 Smaller groups, it was believed,
“were easier to buy off with promises of money.”95 Smaller groups were also more
likely “to find similar motives and band together to empower themselves at the ex-
pense of the citizenry.”96 Large groups supposedly “couldn’t coordinate well enough
to effectively corrupt themselves.”97 Because of this, “the delegates decided to make
the House of Representatives . . . larger to protect against corruption.”98
In addition to the Framers’ concerns about size, Professor Teachout finds evi-
dence of the anti-corruption principle in the constitutional methods adopted for elect-
ing the legislature.99 The Constitution was designed so that members of the House of
Representatives would be elected “by the people,” rather than “by the legislature,” be-
cause of fear that “congressional dependency on state legislatures could allow local
corruption to infect national corruption.”100 Fear of the influence of foreign powers
also supposedly infused the delegates’ fear of corruption, leading to the adoption of
“[t]he clause demanding seven years of residency in the United States” in order to
serve in Congress.101
The provision for regular elections was one of the most important checks on cor-
ruption, Professor Teachout claims.102 The concern was that “longer terms strength-
ened the bonds with the Executive and weakened them with the people.”103 “[T]he
Framers wanted to avoid financial dependency of one branch upon another.”104 But
91 Teachout, supra note 2, at 355.
92 Id. at 342–43.
93 Id. at 354–72.
94 Id. at 354.
95 Id. at 356.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 357.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 358.
102 Id. at 362.
103 Id. at 363.
104 Id. at 362–63.
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whereas “[a] short term would ensure accountability and make it difficult to run too
far on the public purse. . . . a long term would make it more likely that men of good
character would undertake the commitment to service . . . .”105 Elections, therefore,
would ensure that those corrupted by power and wealth would not be reelected.106
The Framers also included provisions to ward off the threat of conflicts and
temptations that might corrupt legislators. Professor Teachout believes the Framers
were concerned “that members of Congress would use their position to enrich
themselves and their friends, and that they would see public office as a place for
gaining civil posts and preferences, instead of as a public duty.”107 Evidence of this
concern is reflected in the Ineligibility and Emoluments Clauses, which were in-
cluded in the Constitution to allay concerns “that wealthy non-residents would pur-
chase elections.”108 These clauses “reflect a deep anxiety about the possibility of
civil service corrupting governmental processes by enabling members of Congress to
create and fund their own positions as civil servants.”109 The Foreign Gifts Clause, she
notes, grew out of fear “that foreign interests would try to use their wealth to tempt
public servants and sway the foreign policy decisions of the new government.”110
Professor Teachout also points to a number of anti-corruption clauses in Articles
II and III. “Article II contains several provisions to limit executive corruption.”111
The Presidential Emoluments Clause, which “forbids the President from being paid
by the United States . . . beyond his general compensation,” is one such provision.112
The clause was adopted “to prevent the President from becoming overly dependent
upon Congress (and thereby corrupted by them).”113 Article II, Section 2, which re-
quires Senate approval of judicial appointment, limits potential Executive corrup-
tion of the judiciary.114 The constitutional provision for impeachment is described by
Professor Teachout as “clearly the strongest anti-corruption element of Section 1.”115
Lastly, like Article I, Article II also carefully prescribes an elections process de-
signed “[t]o guard against corruption.”116
Professor Teachout claims that the purpose of Article III is to keep the judiciary
“independent of both ‘the gust of faction’ and corruption.”117 She interprets the clause
allowing judges to hold office only “during good behavior” to mean in the “absence
105 Id. at 363.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 359.
108 Id. at 357.
109 Id. at 359–60.
110 Id. at 361.
111 Id. at 364.
112 Id. at 365. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
113 Teachout, supra note 2, at 365.
114 Id. See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
115 Teachout, supra note 2, at 367.
116 Id. at 368.
117 Id. at 368–69.
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of corruption,”118 thus supporting the existence of an anti-corruption principle.
Article III, Section 2’s jury trial requirement is also said to be the result of “the anti-
corruption urge.”119
The Constitution’s structural commitments of power are, as Professor Teachout
asserts, “[s]ome of the strongest anti-corruption provisions in the Constitution.”120
Her claim that the separation of powers among the three branches of government was
intended as a check on corruption is not new. For example, G. Edward White has
written that the foundational “republican” principles of the American Republic includ-
ed “the ‘anticorruption’ principle, embodied in the separation of . . . powers.”121
Structural features within the Senate and the House are also identified by Professor
Teachout as being adopted in order to “protect[ ] against corruption.”122 The Framers
believed that “the dignity of the elites might make those in the Senate resistant to
corruption.”123 On the other hand, the House was thought to be resistant to corruption
because, in light of its size, “it would be logically impossible for various representa-
tives to all have similar interests that could be similarly exploited.”124
The preceding discussion has described, in some detail, the scope and rationale
of the anti-corruption principle as it has been fashioned by its leading scholarly
advocate. In the Part that follows, we explore the countless flaws in Professor
Teachout’s analysis in considerably greater scope and detail.
II. THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PRINCIPLE’S FUNDAMENTAL FAILINGS
Professor Teachout’s version of a constitutionally dictated anti-corruption
principle suffers from numerous flaws. These flaws fall under one or more of the
following headings: (1) linguistic, (2) textual, (3) historical, (4) theoretical, and
(5) constitutional. We have already explained the linguistic defects in Professor
Teachout’s wildly broad and counterintuitive use of the term “corruption.”125 We
therefore now turn to explorations of the remaining defects in her analysis.
118 Id. at 369. This definition then leaves open the question: What is corruption? In
Professor Teachout’s view, corruption exists when “[t]he integrity of the object of corrup-
tion is threatened by internal decay.” Id. at 347. Beyond this broad and somewhat circular
definition, Professor Teachout points to what she describes as modern concepts of cor-
ruption: “criminal bribery, inequality, drowned voices, a dispirited public, and a lack of
integrity.” Id. at 387.
119 Id. at 369. Professor Teachout theorizes that the Framers felt that juries were less
susceptible to corruption than judges, “who could be regularly and predictably bought.” Id.
120 Id.
121 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–1835,
at 7 (1988).
122 Teachout, supra note 2, at 371.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 See discussion supra Part I.B.
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A. The Anti-Corruption Principle’s Inconsistency with Constitutional Text
The argument that an anti-corruption principle is embedded in the Constitution re-
lies heavily on a synthesis of individual clauses with the document’s overall structure.
It is indisputable that the Constitution was designed to prevent, among other things,
corruption on the part of government officials. In fact, many of the Constitution’s
provisions, including several clauses cited to support the anti-corruption principle’s
existence, were written to establish a federal government resistant to the dangers of
corruption. But that fact, standing alone, fails to justify the anti-corruption principle
as Professor Teachout has fashioned it for two reasons. First, the type of corruption
that the Framers sought to prevent was far narrower in scope than the sweeping ver-
sion urged by Professor Teachout. Second, the text reveals that the Framers quite con-
sciously chose to fight corruption incrementally and prophylactically. In contrast,
Professor Teachout describes a direct and categorical prohibition on corruption. But
the fact that the Framers were quite clearly aware of the dangers of political corrup-
tion and yet chose not to employ the methodology described by Professor Teachout
demonstrates their unambiguous rejection of the approach she advocates.
Initially, it is important to recognize that the corruption that the Constitution aims
to prevent in no way extends to the anti-corruption principle’s far-reaching definition
of the term. Corruption, as understood by the Framers, involved only the failure of
elected officials to serve their respective electorates.126 It surely did not include an elect-
ed official’s failure to pursue some vague notion of the common good. Corruption,
properly understood, included the situation in which a legislator, on his own, en-
gaged in an activity solely to benefit himself, rather than to benefit his constituents.
It does not include situations of public officials choosing solely to foster or protect
the narrow interests of their constituents, even at the expense of the broader common
good. The Constitution’s Framers designed the federal government to ensure that
elected officials acted in the best interest of their constituents, rather than in their
own personal interests. It was failure to comply with this dictate that the Framers
characterized as corruption.127 Every one of the clauses to which Professor Teachout
points is explainable by the Framers’ desire to ensure that elected officials truly rep-
resent their constituencies, and nothing else.
Equally important is that Professor Teachout has confused narrowly prophylac-
tic structural protections designed to retard the growth of corruption with a direct,
categorical prohibition of corruption—a principle that the Constitution’s text does
not include. Virtually all of the provisions to which Professor Teachout points unam-
biguously establish only the former, not the latter. For example, the Ineligibility and
126 See MICHAEL I. MYERSON, LIBERTY’S BLUEPRINT: HOW MADISON AND HAMILTON
WROTE THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, DEFINED THE CONSTITUTION, AND MADE DEMOCRACY
SAFE FOR THE WORLD 177 (2008) (observing that one of the Framers’ primary concerns was
that elected officials “may forget their obligations to their constituents”).
127 Id.
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Emoluments Clauses128 and the Foreign Gifts Clause,129 which Professor Teachout
points to as Article I’s strongest protections against corruption,130 are classic illus-
trations of the Framers’ limited prophylactic approach. The Foreign Gift Clause’s
strong, “almost petulant”131 prohibition demonstrates that the Framers chose to place
explicit prohibitions on specific invitations to corruption in the Constitution, rather
than categorically ban corruption. This was due to the Framers’ recognition of the fu-
tility of attempting to outlaw “the fallibility of mortals.”132 Instead, they added to the
Constitution “auxiliary precautions” against office-holders’ impropriety—precautions
that “lie[ ] at the heart of the constitutional separation of powers.”133
Articles II and III also include a number of clauses aimed exclusively at stemming
the threat of corruption, rather than categorically banning the activity. The Presidential
Emoluments Clause serves as a check on potential Executive corruption by preventing
the Executive from receiving pay beyond his or her general compensation,134 thus pre-
venting dependency on either Congress or the states. The Executive’s ability to corrupt
the judiciary was limited by Article II, Section 2, which requires Senate approval for
judicial appointments.135 Despite providing for lifetime tenure, Article III prevents ju-
dicial corruption by providing that judges may hold their “[o]ffices [only] during good
[b]ehaviour.”136 Thus, clause after clause of the Constitution demonstrate that the
Framers intended to create a government resistant to the dangers of corruption, as
they understood the term.137 This is a far cry, however, from the sweeping direct ban
on corruption that Professor Teachout purports to glean from the Constitution’s text.
Professor Teachout does not even attempt to provide textual support for her
claim that the anti-corruption principle restricts private citizens. She would be hard-
pressed to do so, because the Constitution’s almost universal limitation to govern-
mental action is well-established and understood. Indeed, the only constitutional
provision that restricts private activities is the Thirteenth Amendment, which pro-
hibits involuntary servitude.138 There is no support in the Constitution for the prop-
osition that citizenship is a public office and thus private citizens are restrained in
the same manner as public officials. To the contrary, the philosophical grounding
of the Constitution in liberal political theory necessarily dictates recognition of a
separation between the state and private citizens.139
128 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
129 Id. § 9, cl. 8.
130 Teachout, supra note 2, at 359.
131 Id. at 361.
132 MYERSON, supra note 126, at 176.
133 Id. at 177.
134 U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 7.
135 Id. § 2, cl. 2.
136 Id. art III, § 1.
137 See infra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
138 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (prohibiting slavery).
139 See Martin H. Redish, Private Contingent Fee Lawyers and Public Power: Constitutional
and Political Implications, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 77, 78–79 (2010) (describing the long
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B. The Anti-Corruption Principle and American Political History
In shaping the anti-corruption principle, Professor Teachout draws support from
a gross misreading of American history. She relies heavily on the writings and debates
of the Framers during and immediately following the Constitutional Convention.140
But the history of the framing actually establishes that the Framers themselves were
committed to the pursuit of narrow special interests.
1. The Framers and the Founding
Contrary to the understanding of anti-corruption principle proponents, American
political thought at the time of the founding actually rejected the notion that a gov-
ernment could be centered on the pursuit of the common good and civic virtue. By
the 1780s, according to one authority, “dozens of historical actors . . . came to doubt
America’s capacity for an overarching commitment to the public good.”141 Historian
Gordon Wood has recounted the fundamental shift in American political thought
from the focus on “individual self-sacrifice for the good of the state” to an emphasis
on what was referred to as “public opinion.”142 America, according to Wood, was de-
signed to “remain free not because of any quality in its citizens of spartan self-sacrifice
to some nebulous public good, but . . . because of the concern each individual would
have in his own self-interest and personal freedom.”143 America, then, was a govern-
ment grounded entirely in the pursuit of its citizens’ self-interest and consent.144
The Framers’ goal was to create a government that would resist the potential
threat of corruption, by which they meant only the failure of elected representatives
to pursue or advance the interests of their constituents.145 The Framers wanted “to in-
sulate the new government from . . . corruption . . . rather than . . . promote virtue.”146
The Framers had come to realize that the notion of an overriding “public good,”
even if subjectively defined, was not viable in a large, heterogeneous society.147
It is important to note that the Framers did not seek to eliminate special interest
groups or factions, nor did they expect elected officials to forgo efforts to advance
standing “public-private dichotomy embodied in the so-called ‘state action’ requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment”).
140 Teachout, supra note 2, at 346–54.
141 Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 523, 578 (1995).
142 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 612
(1998).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 See MYERSON, supra note 126, at 171, 176–77 (describing Madison’s fear that repre-
sentatives would fall victim to the majority faction and fail to protect the interests of the people).
146 James D. Savage, Corruption and Virtue at the Constitutional Convention, 56 J. POL.
174, 176 (1994).
147 Flaherty, supra note 141, at 578.
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the regional interests of their constituents in the name of the “public good.” Indeed,
one need look no further than the Constitutional Convention to see regional interests
and factions at work. Alignment among delegates, and thus among different states, was
largely dictated by narrow state interests regarding the issues before the Convention.
Political scientist Calvin Jillson has provided a model of factional politics at the
Constitutional Convention.148 By analyzing roll call data from the Convention, Jillson
was able to distinguish the specific points in time when state delegates realigned
their interests.149 His findings show that “both the intellectual composition and the
regional distribution of the ideas, values, and attitudes which formed the American
political culture during the founding period” contributed to the various factional
alignments that developed during the Convention.150
The roll call data from the Convention demonstrates the existence of four “very
clear periods of coalition realignment.”151 Each period of realignment serves as an
example of the central role of factions and regional interests in the creation of the
Constitution. Delegates first demonstrated their allegiance to regional interests
during the Convention’s opening days.152 As with all coalitional splits during the
Convention, alignment among delegates fell along state-based divisions. The major
alignments of states were the result of predictable disagreement on some of the most
substantial issues before the delegates.153 The question of representation split the del-
egates into factions based on the size of their respective states.154 Debate over the
projected role of the Executive, on the other hand, resulted in a battle between mid-
dle state delegates and those delegates from the peripheral states.155 The debate over
slavery, not surprisingly, resulted in two distinct groups: the delegates from northern
states, which did not allow slavery, and the delegates from southern states, which did
allow slavery.156 Even among the southern states, however, there was disagreement
among the delegates on the issue of slavery, which was largely rooted in the differ-
ing interests within each state.157
Professor Teachout contends that corruption should be understood to include “the
use of government power and assets to benefit localities or other special interests.”158
148 CALVIN C. JILLSON, CONSTITUTION MAKING: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 (1988).
149 Id. at 28.
150 Id. at 10.
151 Id. at 31.
152 Id. at 32.
153 Id. at 32–34.
154 Id. at 64–65.
155 Id. at 101.
156 See id. at 147–48.
157 Id. at 144–45.
158 Teachout, supra note 2, at 375 (quoting Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause
and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 48 (2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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By her definition, however, virtually all of the delegates at the Convention were cor-
rupt. According to Jillson, the delegates, rather than being united by some “assertedly
universal moral norm”159 or “public good,” “were divided by their adherence to
regionally distinct visions of the republican government that they all professed to
desire.”160 It is impossible to reconcile Professor Teachout’s notion that the Framers
were trying to create a government that would condemn the very acts that proved
essential to the creation of that government: regional interests and factions.
The only general consensus among the delegates was the desire for some form
of republican government.161 But even “republicanism” was not a universally agreed-
upon concept. According to Jillson, “[d]ifferent groups or factions in various sections
of the nation defined ‘republicanism’ as they perceived it and could only view their
opponents as dangerously antirepublican.”162 The delegates were well aware of the
fact that they brought differing views to the table. No one expected mass agreement
on how to form the new nation based on some generalized notion of the common
good.163 As Madison observed, “in general the members seem . . . averse to the tem-
porising expedients.”164
2. Madison on Factions
Professor Teachout’s reliance on Madison’s Federalist No. 10 to support the exis-
tence of her version of a constitutional anti-corruption principle is entirely misplaced.
She points to this famous document as evidence that Madison intended to create a gov-
ernment in which factions would be eliminated.165 According to Professor Teachout,
159 Id. at 376 (quoting Laura S. Underkuffler, Captured by Evil: The Idea of Corruption
in Law (Duke Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Series, Research Paper No. 83, 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=820249) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160 JILLSON, supra note 148, at 18.
161 Id. at 22.
162 Id. (quoting Robert E. Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an
Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 40, 72
(1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
163 Just a week before the Convention, George Mason wrote to his son saying:
[U]pon the great principles of it, I have reason to hope there will be
greater unanimity and less opposition, except from the little States, than
was at first apprehended. The most prevalent idea in the principal States
seems to be a total alteration of the present federal system. . . . It is easy
to foresee that there will be much difficulty in organizing a government
upon this great scale. . . . Yet with a proper degree of coolness, liber-
ality and candor (very rare commodities by the bye), I doubt not but it
may be effected.
Id. at 21–22 (quoting 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 23 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) [hereinafter 3 CONVENTION RECORDS]).
164 Id. at 22 (quoting 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 163, at 27) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
165 Teachout, supra note 2, at 371–72, 375–76.
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Madison was concerned about the dangers of factions and “argued that a large, con-
federate republic was less likely to lead to faction and instability than a small one.”166
She therefore concludes that Madison opposed the corruption caused by the pursuit
of narrow self-interest.167 Professor Teachout fails to grasp, however, that Madison
believed that a large country would decrease the danger that factions might bring to
bear upon the nation because more factions would exist in a larger country, thereby
diluting the relative power of individual factions.168
The most serious flaw in Professor Teachout’s reliance on Madison is her com-
plete failure to acknowledge that Madison expressly rejected any effort to legally
abolish factions—motivated by self-interest or otherwise—because any such effort
would represent a serious threat to liberty.169 Madison therefore accepted the pres-
ence of factions as necessary for the existence of a free society. Factions, according
to Madison, occur when “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or
minority of the whole, . . . are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community.”170 He recognized two conceivable ways to
eliminate factions: “destroying the liberty which is essential to [their] existence; . . .
[or] by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same
interests.”171 Madison considered both alternatives to present a serious threat to
republican government. Most importantly, he concluded that “it could not be a less
folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction,
than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life,
because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.”172 Because ensuring liberty meant
that factions would continue to exist, Madison was willing to tolerate them, for elim-
inating liberty would be “worse than the disease.”173 To be sure, Madison saw po-
tential dangers in any single faction gaining excessive political power. But it was by
controlling factions through the use of prophylactic structural devices, rather than by
rendering them categorically illegal, that he sought to avoid this danger. And, as
previously explained,174 this is the exact objective of the Constitution’s text.
The anti-corruption principle, as Professor Teachout fashions it, clumsily (and
dangerously) seeks to deem unconstitutional a private individual’s pursuit of his own
narrow special interest through the political process. She thus expects of society that
which Madison recognized is impossible to achieve and dangerous to attempt. Far
from enforcing the Framers’ practices and intent, then, Professor Teachout advocates
166 Id. at 372 n.151 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 1, at 83 (James Madison)).
167 Id. at 371–72.
168 See infra notes 216–18 and accompanying text.
169 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 1, at 168–73 (James Madison).
170 Id. at 168.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 See supra notes 128–39 and accompanying text.
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a policy in direct opposition to their goals. Rather than try to fight the inevitable,
Madison accepted reality: “The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature
of man . . . .”175
3. The Central Role of Interest Groups in the History of American Politics
The preceding discussion demonstrates the crucial role that factions played both
at the Constitutional Convention and in the minds of the Framers. American history,
both pre- and post-Convention, tells a similar story, with interest groups playing a
central role in all facets of American political life. It is impossible to reconcile the cen-
tral role of interest groups throughout American history with Professor Teachout’s
assertion that the Constitution was designed to eliminate the very existence of such
groups. One need not be a serious student of American history to know that interest
groups and self-promotion are embedded in this nation’s social fabric.176 Indeed, in the
words of political scholars, “a group basis of American politics has been acknowl-
edged since the founding.”177
The period following the Constitution’s ratification was marked by the con-
tinued prevalence of special interests’ influence over government decisionmaking.
Commentators have long recognized the important dynamic of interest groups in
American political history. “Groups of self-seeking individuals have ever impor-
tuned legislatures for special favors,” observed one early twentieth-century scholar.178
In the words of a politician of the same era, “[g]roups, some of them actuated by the
most patriotic motives, and others purely selfish, have maintained what are commonly
called lobbyists in Washington, I presume since the foundation of the Government.”179
Interest groups today continue to play a vital role in American democracy, as
anyone who follows the news is aware. They have “become an integral part of our
representative system of government.”180 Groups “offer[ ] more effective represen-
tation (than parties) and hence secur[e] overall public policy that better ‘fits’ citizens’
preferences.”181 In addition, “the political and social experiences within groups are
viewed as democratically relevant.”182
175 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 1, at 169 (James Madison).
176 Political scientist David Truman has noted that “the antecedents of the modern trade
association go back on the local level at least to the guild organizations of master craftsmen
and traces of them can be found very early in American history.” DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 75 (1951).
177 Daniel J. Tichenor & Richard A. Harris, Organized Interests and American Political
Development, 117 POL. SCI. Q. 587, 603 (2003).
178 E. PENDLETON HERRING, GROUP REPRESENTATION BEFORE CONGRESS 31 (1929).
179 Id. (quoting Letter from Senator T. H. Caraway to E. Pendleton Herring (Aug. 31,
1927)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
180 Id. at 240.
181 GRANT JORDAN & WILLIAM A. MALONEY, DEMOCRACY AND INTEREST GROUPS:
ENHANCING PARTICIPATION?, at 2 (2007).
182 Id.
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The role of interest groups in American society has grown exponentially during
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, leading some to describe interest groups as
“the stuff of which [American] politics is made.”183 From 1890 to 1899, “256 interest
groups appeared before Congress.”184 By 1917, that number had grown to 1,301.185
These national interest groups existed in order to “advanc[e] their policy goals within
the Washington establishment.”186 Members of Congress reportedly found national
associations to be “valuable in enabling them to arrive at a clearer understanding
of the facts concerning the opinion and the interests of a specific group.”187 These
associations, according to one scholar, “must be understood and their place in gov-
ernment allotted, if not by actual legislation, then by general public realization of their
significance.”188 In 1929, representatives from over 500 national organizations trav-
eled to Washington, D.C. “to watch legislation and speak for their membership.”189
These organizations were “as much a part of the actual government of the country
as [were] other, now well-established units that have arisen outside of the formal
legal framework of law and constitution.”190 Their purpose was “to guard the in-
terests of their respective groups.”191 These organizations typically had two purposes
when lobbying the federal government: “If they [were] not working to get some-
thing for themselves they [were] busily struggling to prevent an enemy organization
from obtaining legislative favors.”192
Interest group formation experienced a “veritable explosion” in the 1960s and
1970s.193 Citizen groups organized around an idea or cause (sometimes called single-
issue groups) saw significant growth during this period as well. Half of all citizen
groups were formed after 1960.194 By 1963, a survey of Americans showed that fifty-
seven percent “reported that they held membership in a voluntary association.”195
Although it is impossible to accurately document the exact number of interest groups
183 Tichenor & Harris, supra note 177, at 589.
184 Id. at 598.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 599.
187 HERRING, supra note 178, at 243.
188 Id. at 268.
189 Id. at 19, 21.
190 Id. at 240.
191 Id. at 23.
192 Id. at 30.
193 Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis, Introduction: The Changing Nature of Interest
Group Politics, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 10 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds.,
1983) (explaining that, as the scope of federal policy-making has expanded, more interest
groups have gone to Washington, D.C. to lobby).
194 Id. at 11.
195 RONALD J. HREBENAR & RUTH K. SCOTT, INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN AMERICA
6 (1982).
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operating in America at any one time, in 1980 the Encyclopedia of Associations
identified over 14,000 national nonprofit organizations.196 Although not all of these
organizations could be labeled narrowly self-interested, there is no doubt that many
did fit this profile. Indeed, every labor union can be said to be seeking to promote
the economic interests of its members, regardless of the impact of such actions on
the interests of the nation as a whole. Moreover, most of us (including, we predict,
Professor Teachout) find nothing immoral or corrupt in workers joining together to
promote their personal economic interests through the political process. There is
little doubt that the First Amendment right of association, long recognized by the
Supreme Court, protects their right to do so.197 Yet Professor Teachout characterizes
such political activity as corrupt and unconstitutional. It is difficult to take seriously
a political and constitutional theory that is so inconsistent with the nation’s accepted
practices and normative perceptions.
Today, no one could reasonably doubt that interest groups remain a vital part of
the American political scene. The American people are aware that they have a right
to seek to influence the political process to advance their self-interest, whether it is
through membership in the National Rifle Association or the National Organization
for Women. Therefore, modern citizens would no doubt be shocked to learn from
Professor Teachout that the Constitution condemns their activities as inherently cor-
rupt and prevents them from taking action to protect and further their own interests.
The modern citizen’s involvement in the political landscape is highlighted by the
number of organizations that continue to thrive. Today, a search for national organi-
zations in the Encyclopedia of Associations generates 24,353 results.198 A similar
search for regional, state, and local organizations generates 98,625 results.199 Yet the
anti-corruption principle, if accepted, would immediately call into question the con-
stitutionality of many of the associations operating in the United States today.
4. The Anti-Corruption Principle and American Democratic Theory
The anti-corruption principle, in its rejection of self-interest as a legitimate basis
for political action, is irreconcilable with the foundations of liberal democratic theory
and the American democratic tradition. Majority rule, electoral representation, and
196 Id. at 8.
197 See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000) (“‘[I]mplicit in the
right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment’ is ‘a corresponding right to
associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational,
religious, and cultural ends.’” (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984))).
198 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS, GALE RESEARCH, available at http://galenet.galegroup
.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/servlet/AU/form?origSearch=false&n=100&l=1&locID
=northwestern&secondary=false&u=r&u=s.
199 Id.
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the concept of one-citizen/one-vote are central to American democracy.200 Inherent
in this formulation of American democracy is the assumption that citizens’ interests
may constantly be in conflict, leading to recognition of the centrality of the democratic
theory called “adversary democracy,” a phrase coined by political scientist Jane
Mansbridge.201 The anti-corruption principle threatens the heart of America’s adver-
sarially based democratic system, which (short of quid pro quo bribery, of course)
ensures a citizen’s right to attempt to influence the political process to advance his
or her own best interest. There are two ways individuals may seek, through exercise
of their expressive rights, to achieve their political goals: (1) convince those in power
to take action on their behalf, or (2) attempt to elect candidates who share their
political positions. Professor Teachout’s anti-corruption principle severely impairs
both opportunities whenever individuals seek to advance their personal interests in
either manner.
In order to understand why the anti-corruption principle is incompatible with ad-
versary democracy, it is essential first to understand what this version of democrat-
ic theory encompasses. Adversary democracy recognizes that in any self-governing
society, people’s interests will inevitably conflict.202 In a truly democratic society,
“[e]ach individual’s interests are [considered to be] of equal value.”203 This is not
to say, however, that all citizens must be able to exert equal power or influence.
Rather, the equal protection of interests is accomplished through the equal distri-
bution of power to representatives.204 Citizens pursue their own interests by voting
and lobbying their representatives “in proportion to the intensity of their feelings.”205
Adversary democracy, as one of the authors has previously written, “recognizes
democracy as a system of collective self-government that manages conflict—and thus
protects and facilitates individual autonomy—by institutionalizing it as a normal part
of democratic life.”206 The conflict that exists in a system of collective self-government
is the inescapable result of the inevitably “competing interests and ideologies that
motivate individuals.”207 It follows, therefore, that a large, heterogeneous society will
rarely, if ever, share a singular vision of a substantive “public interest.”208 In fact,
200 JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 3 (1980) (asserting that the
combination of these three concepts “is democracy”).
201 Id.
202 Id. at 4–5, 18 (“The mechanical aggregation of conflicting selfish desires is the very
core of an adversary system.”).
203 Id. at 17.
204 Id. at 6 (explaining that people are more successful in protecting their interests when
they give power to representatives than when they retain powers).
205 Id. at 17.
206 Redish & Mollen, supra note 42, at 1353.
207 Id.
208 Madison recognized as much in a letter written in 1787 to Jefferson, stating: “In all
civilized Societies, distinctions are various and unavoidable.” WOOD, supra note 142, at 502
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acceptance of the contention that a monolithic “public interest” exists apart from the
interests of the individual citizens could enable the more powerful to mislead the
less powerful into collaborating in ways that primarily benefit the former.209
Long before Professor Mansbridge coined the term “adversary democracy,” our
democratic system recognized the individual’s ability to promote his self-interest as
he determines it as a central tenet of political life. “[L]iberal theory holds that indi-
viduals establish political authority and engage in political activities to pursue their
individually-defined purposes.”210 Hence, an individual’s purpose may not be defined
by a collective authority. To be sure, in most situations the individual must ultimately
abide by the choices of the majority, or at least its elected representatives. But American
democracy is historically based on the expectation that the individual will be able to
influence choices in ways that benefit him, as evidenced (in Gordon Woods’s words)
by the “total grounding of [American] government in self-interest.”211 As framed by
Professor Teachout, the anti-corruption principle would restrict any government-
related activity motivated by the desire to promote individual self-interest at the ex-
pense of the common good—whatever that means, and whoever gets to define it.
Citizens would only be allowed to interact with the government when motivated by
an interest in advancement of the public interest.212 Her theory thus clashes with the
premises of adversary democracy, which are dictated by the premise of liberal de-
mocracy and have dominated the nation since its founding.
It would of course be naive to suggest that adversary democracy is free of
problems. Some no doubt believe that, at least in certain instances, promotion of
one’s own interest at the expense of, or at least without regard to, the interests of
others is normatively reprehensible.213 But it is important to understand that there
is nothing inherent in the concept of adversary democracy that precludes the indi-
vidual from choosing to act on the bases of altruism, ideology, or abstract moral
principle, rather than purely on the basis of narrow self-interest. The point of
adversary democracy is simply that this moral choice ultimately must rest with the
individual citizen, rather than be imposed by some externally derived moral force.
It is important to recognize how much we take for granted the moral legitimacy
of the promotion of self-interest. Medicare recipients urging their representatives
to increase their benefits despite the resulting increase in the nation’s budget deficit
is, after all, an example of self-promotion, and therefore of adversary democracy.
(quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 12 JEFFERSON
PAPERS 277–78 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955)).
209 MANSBRIDGE, supra note 200, at 5.
210 Arthur L. Kalleberg & Larry M. Preston, Liberal Paradox: Self-Interest & Respect for
Political Principles, 17 POLITY 360, 360 (1984).
211 WOOD, supra note 142, at 612 (explaining that the freedom of America rested in each
individual’s concern for his own self-interest and personal freedom).
212 See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
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Yet many of those who attack self-interest in politics would no doubt consider such
promotion not only acceptable, but even desirable. At the very least, no one, we
imagine, would seriously suggest that such self-promotional efforts were not fully
protected by the First Amendment right of free expression, despite their inescapable
grounding in self-interest.
Once one accepts that self-promotional group politics, as a matter of American
political theory and practice, is both normatively legitimate and historically well-
established, one must logically accept the centrality of adversary democracy to
American politics. And once one reaches that conclusion, one must reject any com-
mitment to the mutually inconsistent anti-corruption principle.
This is not to say, of course, that special interest group politics is immune to
abuse. In Federalist No. 10, Madison warned of the serious threat of factions to
democratic rule.214 But, as previously shown, rather than try to eliminate special in-
terest groups altogether, Madison sought to establish prophylactic structural devices
designed to prevent and control the potential for such abuse.215 The American ex-
perience leading up to the Constitution’s creation, according to Gordon Wood,
“demonstrated that no republic could be made small enough to contain a homoge-
neous interest that the people could express through the voice of the majority.”216 In
light of this, Madison recognized that a large republic was necessary so that no one
special interest group would dominate. Madison believed that an extended sphere of
government would encourage the creation of additional factions so that, in the end,
the various special interests would balance each other out.217 He sought to structure
a government in which “no one common interest or passion will be likely to unite
a majority of the whole number in an unjust pursuit.”218
Under Professor Teachout’s anti-corruption principle, civic virtue is assumed
to be the sole legitimate motivating force underlying the political choices of all
office-holders, a concept that she posits encompasses both elected officials and pri-
vate citizens.219 But although the Framers included prohibitions in the Constitution
against actions that a legislator might be tempted to undertake in furtherance of his
own self-interest at the expense of his constituents, they never banned government de-
cisions designed to benefit specific groups of constituents. And they most certainly
did nothing to prevent private citizens from seeking to influence the political process
in pursuit of their personal or economic interests.
214 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 1, at 168–73 (James Madison).
215 See supra notes 165–70 and accompanying text.
216 WOOD, supra note 142, at 504.
217 See Redish & Mollen, supra note 42, at 1357 (quoting HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THE
CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 196 (1967)).
218 WOOD, supra note 142, at 504 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson,
supra note 208).
219 Teachout, supra note 2, at 375.
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III. THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PRINCIPLE’S OMINOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHT OF FREE EXPRESSION
Above and beyond its numerous theoretical and historical problems, the most
serious concern raised by the anti-corruption principle is its extremely harmful impact
on the First Amendment right of free expression. This is true as a matter of both First
Amendment theory and doctrine. On a theoretical level, the anti-corruption principle
conflicts with the foundational premise of a system of free expression: commitment
to the precept of epistemological humility. A concept of free expression confined ex
ante by an externally derived normative dictate is effectively no right at all. As the
Supreme Court has long recognized, the right to speak cannot be confined to expres-
sion of only one predetermined viewpoint.220 Yet the anti-corruption principle seeks
to shape American governmental structure and the right of free expression in order
to implement a commitment to only one normative political theoretical model—
namely, a preference for pursuit of the common good, rather than the promotion of
individual interest.221
On a less abstract level, advocates of the anti-corruption principle appear obliv-
ious to the dramatically harmful impact that acceptance of their principle would have
on free speech. For one thing, the necessary logical implications of a commitment
to the anti-corruption principle would be that political activities motivated by concern
for the common good would receive First Amendment protection, whereas those mo-
tivated by pure self-interest would not. It is difficult to imagine a more invidious
degradation of First Amendment rights. Yet if that is not deemed the logical impli-
cation of the anti-corruption principle, then the anti-corruption principle would seem
to serve no purpose at all.
In addition to its inherent viewpoint-based impact, the anti-corruption principle’s
advocates completely ignore the simple fact that political communication costs money,
and therefore a restriction on the use of money in political campaigns inevitably re-
stricts the availability of information and opinion to the electorate. And there is no
way to know, ex ante, that all or even most of that information and opinion will be
worthless. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the First Amendment assures that
it is the individual, not the government, who determines a communication’s worth.222
Thus, purportedly in an effort to abolish a form of “corruption” that our system has
never sought to suppress (or even characterize as “corruption”), anti-corruption
220 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
221 See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
222 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978) (“[T]he people
in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative
merits of conflicting arguments.”).
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principle advocates would substantially undermine something that has long been
central to the American political tradition: free and open debate in the course of a
political campaign.
Professor Teachout argues that the First Amendment should not “breathe[ ] at
the expense of political integrity.”223 However, it is by no means clear what her con-
cept of “political integrity” is designed to include. The vagueness inherent in that
phrase potentially allows for the suppression of virtually any political speech, as
long as the speech is found to have occurred “at the expense of political integrity.”224
Professor Teachout writes that “[p]olitical integrity is threatened by . . . the per-
ception of people that they do not have the character or capacity to control the federal
government.”225 But would this mean that First Amendment protection would turn
on some sort of empirical assessment of voter attitudes, with the level of protection
changing as the results of the surveys change? What if different surveys gave rise
to conflicting results? And even if those were the public’s perceptions, how could
anyone know what specific acts or events had led to them? Would it matter whether
those perceptions had any basis in reality? Or is this nothing more than a rhetorical
flourish, designed simply to justify sweeping suppression of free and open political
communication? Either way, subjective voter preference is a dangerous basis on
which to justify the suppression of valuable political expression. Presumably by the
same questionable reasoning, suppression of the speech of Communists in the 1950s
could have been justified on the bases of surveys showing that voters considered
them a threat to American democracy. Surely, widespread restrictions on political
speech cannot be grounded in such a subjective and volatile foundation. The same
is true, however, of the presumably well-meaning but sorely misguided advocates
of the anti-corruption principle.
Implicit in Professor Teachout’s argument is the notion that political speech may
be suppressed when it results in anything that falls within her preposterously broad
definition of “corruption.” Recall that, according to Professor Teachout, there are four
situations, in addition to criminal bribery, in which corruption arises: political inequal-
ity, drowned voices, dispirited public, and lack of integrity.226 The anti-corruption
principle would provide the constitutional basis for the elimination of potentially
valuable political expression in all of these situations. Professor Teachout appears
to be totally oblivious to the serious costs that will be incurred if the anti-corruption
principle is used to remedy her wholly subjective versions of corruption. If the Court
were to take such an approach, modern free speech protections would be seriously
eroded—if not virtually destroyed—in the political process.
The statute invalidated in the Court’s decision in Citizens United illustrates the
danger of permitting anti-corruption interests to trump First Amendment protections.
223 Teachout, supra note 2, at 406.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 411–12.
226 Id. at 387; see also supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
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In Citizens United, a non-profit organization challenged the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)227 on First Amendment grounds.228 During the 2008
presidential primary season, the non-profit corporation, Citizens United, released a
film about then-Senator Hillary Clinton, who was vying for the Democratic presiden-
tial nomination.229 Citizens United received most of its funding from individual do-
nors, but it also received a small amount of funding from for-profit corporations.230
In light of the fear that the film would be covered by BCRA’s ban on corporate-
funded independent expenditures, Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive
relief against the Federal Election Commission, arguing that the BCRA prohibition
was unconstitutional as applied to the film.231
The Court, in holding that BCRA’s restrictions on corporate expenditures were
unconstitutional,232 recognized the inherent problem with any law that restricted
speech solely based on who the speaker was—in this case, a nonprofit organization
that received some funding from for-profit corporations.233 “Speech,” the Court ob-
served, “is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials
accountable to the people.”234 The Court noted that
[t]he right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use in-
formation to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened
self-government and a necessary means to protect it. The First
Amendment “has its fullest and most urgent application” to
speech uttered during a campaign for political office.235
By restricting people’s motivations when they engage in political discourse, the anti-
corruption principle threatens the “fullest and most urgent application” of the First
Amendment—the protection of political speech.236 The Court concluded that “po-
litical speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design
or inadvertence.”237
227 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 47 U.S.C.).
228 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 888 (2010).
229 Id. at 887.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 888.
232 Id. at 917 (finding unconstitutional “2 U.S.C. § 441b’s restrictions on corporate in-
dependent expenditures”).
233 Id. at 899 (“We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech,
the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers. Both history and
logic lead us to this conclusion.”).
234 Id. at 898.
235 Id. (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)
(citations omitted)).
236 Id.; see also supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
237 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
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The anti-corruption principle would provide constitutional legitimacy to laws
that sweepingly suppress political speech. Under the anti-corruption principle, a law
need only purport to suppress political speech that is motivated by self-interest to
survive a First Amendment challenge. As a result, citizens would be denied the in-
formation and opinions essential to making their political choices. Many national
associations whose purpose is to advocate on behalf of its members could be con-
stitutionally prohibited from doing so in the political arena, because by their very
nature they are committed to the advancement of their membership’s narrow self-
interest. It is impossible to believe that the Constitution was designed to tolerate
such devastating suppression.
Professor Teachout seeks to rationalize the need for the anti-corruption principle
in terms of the causes of corruption, primarily “[u]nequal access to political life, and
political power.”238 According to Professor Teachout, “basic intuition” tells us “that
there must be some kind of equality in political access.”239 Political access here takes
on a much larger connotation than simply the right to vote. For Professor Teachout,
political access includes all forms of politically related speech, including campaign
contributions and campaign expenditures.240 The problem, as Professor Teachout sees
it, is that money in politics generally results in unequal access and unequal voice.241
The more that speakers are able to communicate their message to a political actor, the
more likely the political actor is to decide in a fashion favorable to the communicator.
Campaign contributions, which allow people to communicate messages to candidates,
“are likely to warp [political actors’] decisions.”242 A political actor whose decisions
are “warped” because of campaign contributions is considered “corrupt.”243 The in-
dividuals (or organizations) making the contributions are also considered “corrupt”
if their contributions are motivated by a personal interest in the candidate’s election,
rather than an interest in advancing the “public good.”244 Therefore, limitations on
campaign contributions are deemed necessary to create political equality and stave
off corruption.
Other scholars have also rationalized the anti-corruption principle on the basis
of equality concerns. David Strauss, for example, has argued that “‘corruption’ in the
system of campaign finance is a concern . . . principally because of inequality.”245
Strauss questions the validity of the Court’s statement in Buckley v. Valeo that gov-
ernment restriction of “the speech of some elements of our society in order to
238 Teachout, supra note 2, at 391.
239 Id. at 393.
240 Id. at 392–93.
241 Id. at 392.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 392–93.
244 See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
245 Strauss, supra note 2, at 1370.
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enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”246
He views campaign contributions as tantamount to votes, and thus deserving of the
same equality-preserving measures.247 Burt Neuborne similarly views the unequal
distribution of wealth in political campaigns as a threat to society that must be
addressed.248 According to Neuborne, “wealth disparity introduces massive political
inequality skewed to a predictable set of self-interested positions. Massive political
inequality skewed to self-interest, without instrumental justification, strikes at the
moral underpinnings of democracy by permitting wholly unjustifiable differences
in political power to emerge.”249 He concludes that the Court will only view the fight
against corruption broadly if “political equality is . . . smuggled back into the cam-
paign finance picture in the guise of a concern with systemic corruption.”250 The
primary flaw in the reasoning of these highly respected scholars is their failure to rec-
ognize the dangers to free and open political debate that would inevitably result from
a reduction of would-be speakers to the lowest common economic denominator. A
second fallacy is their false equation of expression with the exercise of the vote.
Unlike expression, the vote has automatic and immediate legal consequences—the
election of government officials.251 In any event, the argument proves too much, be-
cause it would reduce every speaker’s legal ability to speak to the lowest common
denominator—a truly preposterous restriction. But whichever way one comes out on
this important question, it surely does not advance debate to label the pro-speech
position “corruption,” with all of the term’s linguistic baggage and associations.
The anti-corruption principle is also designed to restrict well-funded speech when
its effect is to “drown out” the speech of less economically powerful speakers.252 But
neither Professor Teachout nor any other scholar or court has provided any evidence
to support the proposition that well-funded speech drowns out other points of view;
nor could they, because in all but the most extreme cases the “drowning out” con-
cept makes no logical sense. Except in the case of a truly “limited pie” of expressive
resources—for example, when one candidate purchases all available television and
radio advertising space—the scope and amount of Candidate A’s expression have no
246 Id. at 1369 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
247 Id. at 1385 (explaining that contributions are similar enough to votes to question why
“one person, one vote” is the constitutional requirement for distribution of the latter state-
created right, but an anathema for regulation of the former).
248 Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1072 (“I believe that we should be extremely concerned with
a set of institutional decisions that creates massive wealth-driven disparities in political power.”).
249 Id.
250 Id. at 1056.
251 For a more detailed response to the argument that speech in a political campaign should
be equated with the vote, see MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER,
AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 136–39 (2001).
252 See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
1084 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 20:1053
impact on Candidate B’s ability to communicate her message. Even if Candidate A’s
expression were cut in half, that would have absolutely no impact on Candidate B’s
ability to communicate to the electorate. It would mean solely that the relative po-
sition of Candidate B would have improved. Telling those with money that they can-
not spend it on political campaigns does not provide money and means for those who
have none. The net result of an equality-based approach to corruption is an equality
of ignorance. Society is deprived of the information those with economic power
would have shared, but the resultant void is left unfilled.
CONCLUSION
Professor Teachout’s arguments in support of the anti-corruption principle
were apparently persuasive enough to convince Justice Stevens, who relied on her
scholarship in his dissent in Citizens United.253 This is truly amazing, because her
version of the anti-corruption principle has absolutely nothing to recommend it. It
is unsupportable in its assertions that the Constitution directly imposes a sweeping
prohibition on political corruption and that the constitutional restriction extends to
the political activities of private citizens, as well as elected officials. To complicate
matters, she defines “corruption”—generally associated by the common person with
quid pro quo bribery—to include pretty much anything that is inconsistent with the
positions of one particular ideological perspective. Moreover, her theory is com-
pletely inconsistent with the reasoning and constitutional strategy adopted by the
Framers, as well as with the nation’s long history of interest group politics.
In an ideal world, it would be wonderful for constitutional scholars to be able
to ignore text, Framers’ understandings, well-established history, accepted linguis-
tic usage, and principled analysis in order to implement completely their own
ideological perspectives through the device of constitutional analysis. Professor
Teachout has sought to do just that, and others seem to share her perspective.
Thankfully, the Supreme Court to date has refused to indulge Professor Teachout’s
ideologically driven approach. One can only hope that a principled constitutional
analysis categorically rejecting the dangerous anti-corruption principle continues
to prevail.
253 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 948 & n.51, 963–64 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
